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On	closing	the	circle	
Peter	J.	Lewis	
	
Abstract:	
Ghirardi	sought	to	“close	the	circle”—to	find	a	place	for	human	experience	of	measurement	
outcomes	within	quantum	mechanics.	I	argue	that	Ghirardi’s	spontaneous	collapse	approach	
succeeds	at	this	task,	and	in	fact	does	so	even	without	the	postulation	of	a	particular	account	of	
“primitive	ontology”,	such	as	a	mass	density	distribution	or	a	discrete	“flashes”.	Nevertheless,	I	
suggest	that	there	is	a	remaining	ontological	problem	facing	spontaneous	collapse	theories	
concerning	the	use	of	classical	concepts	like	“particle”	in	quantum	mechanical	explanation	at	
the	micro-level.	Neither	the	mass	density	nor	the	flash	ontology	is	any	help	with	this	problem.	
	
1.	Introduction	
I	remember	the	first	time	I	came	across	Gian	Carlo	Ghirardi’s	work.	I	was	a	graduate	student	at	
U.	C.	Irvine,	and	my	advisor,	Jeff	Barrett,	sent	me	to	read	the	original	GRW	paper	(Ghirardi,	
Rimini	and	Weber	1986).	When	I	was	done,	I	thought	to	myself	“Well,	that’s	it.	The	physicists	
have	solved	the	measurement	problem,	and	there’s	nothing	left	for	us	philosophers	to	do”.	
Fortunately	(for	me),	my	initial	thought	was	premature;	there	was	plenty	of	work	left,	for	both	
physicists	and	philosophers,	both	refining	the	various	spontaneous	collapse	models,	and	
clarifying	the	surrounding	concepts.	Indeed,	Ghirardi	himself	was	deeply	involved	in	both	sides	
of	this	work.	
	 One	of	the	conceptual	projects	involves	what	Shimony	(1989)	calls	“closing	the	circle”.	
Physics	begins	with	human	experience:	we	postulate	physical	theories	to	explain	what	we	
observe.	Physical	theories,	insofar	as	they	are	successful,	tell	us	what	the	world	is	like.	But	that	
world,	of	course,	includes	human	beings	and	their	experiences.	So,	for	consistency,	we	need	to	
be	able	to	locate	human	beings	and	human	experiences	within	the	world-view	provided	by	our	
physical	theories.	
	 Ghirardi	recognized	the	importance	of	closing	the	circle	in	physics,	and	proposed	a	
particular	strategy	for	doing	so	in	the	context	of	his	spontaneous	collapse	approach	to	quantum	
mechanics	(Ghirardi,	Grassi	and	Benatti	1995).	What	I	want	to	do	in	this	paper	is	to	locate	
Ghirardi’s	proposal	within	a	broader	discussion	of	what	it	takes	to	close	the	circle.	In	particular,	
I	will	argue	that,	while	some	proposals	in	the	foundations	of	quantum	mechanics	fail	to	
adequately	close	the	circle,	Ghirardi’s	proposal	succeeds;	however,	it	does	so	by	making	more	
physical	commitments	than	are	strictly	necessary.	I	advocate	a	strategy	for	closing	the	circle	
very	like	Ghirardi’s	but	pared	of	excess	physical	structure.	Finally,	I	argue	that	the	more	pressing	
problem	for	spontaneous	collapse	theories	concerns	explanation	at	the	microscopic	level,	and	
that	here	Ghirardi’s	proposal	is	little	help.	
	
2.	How	not	to	close	the	circle	
Closing	the	circle	might	seem	like	a	trivial	exercise.	After	all,	if	our	physical	theories	describe	the	
behavior	of	matter	at	the	smallest	scales,	and	if	human	beings	are	just	complicated	chunks	of	
matter,	then	our	physical	theories	automatically	describe	the	behavior	of	human	beings,	
including	their	eyes	and	their	brains.	How,	then	could	a	physical	theory	fail	to	find	a	place	for	
human	experience?	
	 Closing	the	circle	does	indeed	look	trivial	from	a	classical	perspective,	but	quantum	
mechanics	challenges	much	that	we	thought	we	could	take	for	granted.	The	basic	difficulty	is	
just	the	measurement	problem.	Take	a	spin-1/2	particle,	and	prepare	it	in	a	superposition	of	
two	z-spin	eigenstates:	2-1/2(|­ñz	+	|¯ñz).	Now	measure	the	spin	of	the	particle	along	the	z-axis.	
In	the	spirit	of	closing	the	circle,	take	the	measuring	device	to	be	described	by	quantum	
mechanics,	where	|upñm	is	an	eigenstate	in	which	the	measuring	device	reads	“spin-up”,	and	
|downñm	is	an	eigenstate	in	which	it	reads	“spin-down”.	Quantum	mechanics	entails	that	after	
applying	the	measuring	device	to	the	particle	and	allowing	their	states	to	become	correlated,	
the	final	state	of	the	particle	plus	the	measuring	device	is	2-1/2(|­ñz|upñm	+	|¯ñz|downñm).	It	
looks	like	there	is	nothing	in	this	final	state	that	represents	the	(unique)	outcome	of	this	
measurement.	And	since	the	measuring	device	m	could	include	a	human	observer,	there	is	
nothing	in	the	final	state	that	represents	the	(unique)	experience	of	the	observer.	So	it	looks	
like	there	is	nowhere	to	locate	human	experience	within	the	quantum	formalism,	and	closing	
the	circle	becomes	a	problem.	
	 Closing	the	circle	is	related	to	von	Neumann’s	psychophysical	parallelism	(1955,	419),	
and	indeed	discussions	of	closing	the	circle	are	often	couched	in	terms	of	postulating	a	
psychophysical	parallelism	(Bell	1987,	45;	Ghirardi,	Grassi	and	Benatti	1995,	33).	But	it	
important	to	distinguish	psychophysical	parallelism	from	closing	the	circle,	in	particular	because	
von	Neumann’s	account	of	psychophysical	parallelism	fails	to	close	the	circle.	
	 Von	Neumann	notes	that	there	is	at	best	a	vague	distinction	between	measured	systems	
and	measuring	devices,	and	hence	that	it	is	arbitrary	where	physical	analysis	stops.	When	
measuring	temperature,	for	example,	one	can	count	the	thermometer	as	external	to	the	
system,	or	as	part	of	the	system	and	hence	subject	to	physical	modelling.	The	same	goes	for	
human	observers:	one	can	treat	the	eye	or	the	brain	as	external	to	the	physical	system,	or	as	
part	of	the	physical	system.	Given	this	arbitrariness,	it	shouldn’t	matter	to	the	predicted	
outcome	of	an	experiment	where	we	place	this	“cut”.	Von	Neumann	calls	the	principle	that	
“the	boundary	between	the	observed	system	and	the	observer	can	be	displaced	arbitrarily”	the	
“principle	of	the	psycho-physical	parallelism”	(1955,	421)	
	 This	is	a	perfectly	good	methodological	principle,	and	von	Neumann’s	proof	that	his	
“collapse	on	measurement”	formulation	of	quantum	mechanics	satisfies	it	is	an	important	
demonstration	that	it	exhibits	a	particular	kind	of	self-consistency.	But	it	isn’t	the	same	as	
closing	the	circle.	Note	in	particular	his	insistence	that	“we	must	always	divide	the	world	into	
two	parts,	the	one	being	the	observed	system,	the	other	being	the	observer”	(1955,	420).	The	
observed	part	is	subject	to	physical	modelling	by	quantum	mechanics;	for	the	observer,	physical	
modelling	“is	meaningless”	(1955,	420).	This	division	crucial	to	his	formulation:	when	the	
observed	part	does	not	interact	with	the	observing	part,	we	should	model	the	observed	part	
using	the	linear	Schrödinger	dynamics,	but	when	the	two	portions	interact,	we	should	model	
the	observed	part	using	the	non-linear	collapse	dynamics.	In	other	words,	the	explanation	for	
the	collapse,	and	thereby	for	our	experience	of	measurement	outcomes,	necessarily	lies	outside	
the	system	modelled	by	quantum	mechanics.	Von	Neumann’s	approach	blocks	the	possibility	of	
closing	the	circle	by	design.	
	 One	might	think	that	this	barrier	to	closing	the	circle	is	inevitable.	In	introducing	the	
concept,	Shimony	notes	that	“the	greatest	obstacle	to	“closing	the	circle”	is	the	ancient	one	
which	haunted	Descartes	and	Locke—the	mind-body	problem,”	and	conjectures	that	quantum	
mechanics	may	be	“hospitable	to	a	dualism	of	mind	and	body”	(1989,	37).	If	the	experiencing	
mind	is	non-physical,	then	of	course	it	always	lies	beyond	physical	analysis,	however	far	that	
analysis	penetrates	the	workings	of	the	brain.	But	positing	dualism	essentially	just	amounts	to	
an	admission	that	the	circle	can’t	be	closed.	And	it	is	a	peculiarly	unmotivated	admission:	our	
increasing	knowledge	of	the	brain	strongly	suggests	that	the	varieties	of	human	experience	
have	a	physical	origin.	The	possibility	of	a	“hard	problem”	of	consciousness	is	irrelevant	here:	
we	know	empirically	that	various	experiential	states	are	grounded	in	particular	brain	states,	
even	if	there	is	a	residual	explanatory	gap	concerning	the	phenomenal	nature	of	those	
experiential	states.	The	problem	of	“closing	the	circle”,	then,	is	the	problem	of	finding	a	way	to	
explain	those	brain	states	quantum	mechanically.	It	is	here	that	von	Neumann	fails,	since	the	
quantum	mechanical	explanation	of	determinate	post-measurement	brain	states	appeals	to	the	
deus	ex	machina	of	interaction	with	an	“observer”.	
	
3.	Closing	the	circle	with	quantum	jumps		
So	Shimony’s	concern	about	the	mind-body	problem	is	a	red	herring.	Setting	this	concern	aside,	
Shimony	gives	an	indication	of	his	preferred	method	for	closing	the	circle,	citing	the	GRW	
approach	as	the	“most	promising	to	date”	(1989,	35).	By	adding	a	stochastic	“collapse”	term	to	
the	Schrödinger	dynamics,	the	GRW	approach	can	apparently	explain	measurement	outcomes,	
including	human	brain	states,	without	appeal	to	an	extra-physical	“observer”.	The	collapses	
ensure	that	for	a	system	consisting	of	a	large	number	of	well-correlated	particles,	the	wave	
function	is,	with	high	probability,	well-localized	around	one	point	in	configuration	space.	Since	
measuring	devices	and	brains	consist	of	large	numbers	of	well-correlated	particles,	it	looks	like	
this	is	enough	to	close	the	circle.	
	 However,	there	is	a	remaining	gap	in	the	circle,	described	here	by	Bell	(1987,	44):	
There	 is	nothing	 in	this	theory	but	the	wavefunction.	 It	 is	 in	the	wavefunction	that	we	
must	find	an	image	of	the	physical	world,	and	in	particular	of	the	arrangement	of	things	
in	ordinary	 three-dimensional	 space.	But	 the	wavefunction	as	a	whole	 lives	 in	a	much	
bigger	space,	of	3N-dimensions.	It	makes	no	sense	to	ask	for	the	amplitude	or	phase	or	
whatever	of	the	wavefunction	at	a	point	in	ordinary	space.	It	has	neither	amplitude	nor	
phase	nor	anything	else	until	a	multitude	of	points	in	ordinary	three-space	are	specified.		
The	GRW	dynamics	governs	the	evolution	of	the	wave	function	in	3N-dimensional	space;	on	the	
face	of	it,	it	says	nothing	about	a	three-dimensional	space	inhabited	by	measuring	instruments	
and	brains.	Certainly	it	can’t	be	the	wave	function	that	is	well-localized	in	three-space—that	
would	be	a	mathematical	category	mistake.	But	if	the	GRW	theory	says	nothing	about	the	
contents	of	three-space,	obviously	it	can’t	close	the	circle.	
	 Bell	(1987,	45)	proposes	a	way	to	plug	the	gap:		
However,	the	GRW	jumps	(which	are	part	of	the	wavefunction,	not	something	else)	are	
well-localized	in	ordinary	space.	Indeed,	each	is	centred	on	a	particular	spacetime	point	
(x,	t)	…	A	piece	of	matter	then	is	a	galaxy	of	such	events.	As	a	schematic	psychophysical	
parallelism	we	can	suppose	that	our	personal	experience	is	more	or	less	directly	of	events	
in	particular	pieces	of	matter,	our	brains,	which	events	are	in	turn	correlated	with	events	
in	our	bodies	as	a	whole,	and	they	in	turn	with	events	in	the	outer	world.	
The	idea	is	that	the	GRW	theory	does,	after	all,	describe	the	contents	of	three-space:	it	
describes	discrete,	point-like	events	in	three-space,	with	one	such	event	corresponding	to	the	
center-point	of	each	GRW	collapse.	The	GRW	collapse	dynamics	ensures	that	these	point-like	
“flashes”	will	pick	out	a	unique	reading	on	the	measurement	apparatus	or	a	unique	brain	state	
for	an	observer.	Note	that	Bell’s	invocation	of	“psycho-physical	parallelism”	isn’t	a	reference	to	
von	Neumann’s	principle	about	arbitrarily	moving	the	observer-observed	boundary.	Bell	simply	
means	to	point	out	that	experience	covaries	with	a	person’s	brain	state,	so	if	the	GRW	
dynamics	can	ensure	determinate	brain	states,	it	can	ensure	determinate	experience,	and	thus	
close	the	circle.	
	 Ghirardi	sees	the	same	problem,	but	proposes	a	different	solution.	Rather	than	point-
like	events,	Ghirardi	proposes	that	the	GRW	theory	describes	a	mass	density	distribution	in	
three-dimensional	space,	defined	in	terms	of	the	configuration-space	wave	function	𝛹(𝑡)	by	ℳ 𝐫, 𝑡 = 𝛹(𝑡) 𝑀(𝐫) 𝛹(𝑡) ,	
where	𝑀(𝐫)	is	the	mass	density	operator	for	location	r	in	three-space	(Ghirardi,	Grassi	and	
Benatti	1995,	16).	This	proposal	has	the	advantage	over	Bell’s	that	it	is	adaptable	to	continuous	
variants	of	the	GRW	theory	(e.g.	Ghirardi,	Pearle	and	Rimini	1990),	in	which	there	are	no	
discrete	collapse	events.	As	far	as	closing	the	circle	goes,	though,	it	proceeds	very	much	like	
Bell’s	version:	the	GRW	dynamics	(discrete	or	continuous)	makes	sure	that	the	mass	density	
distribution	picks	out	a	unique	reading	of	the	measurement	apparatus	or	a	unique	brain	state	
of	the	observer	(Ghirardi,	Grassi	and	Benatti	1995,	36).	
	4.	Primitive	ontology	
Hence	we	have	two	distinct	proposals	for	closing	the	circle	within	the	GRW	model,	one	“flashy”	
and	one	“massy”.	These	have	been	described	as	distinct	primitive	ontologies	for	the	GRW	
theory	(Allori	et	al.	2008,	359).	A	primitive	ontology	plays	a	dual	role:	it	is	that	which	the	theory	
is	about,	and	it	is	that	which	explains	the	properties	of	everyday	macroscopic	objects	(Allori	
2013,	60).	That	is,	the	existence	of	a	primitive	ontology	allows	for	the	possibility	of	“closing	the	
circle”,	as	it	is	in	terms	of	the	primitive	ontology	that	the	connection	between	the	scientific	
image	and	the	manifest	image	is	spelled	out.	Indeed,	Allori	(2013,	66–69)	takes	the	problematic	
nature	of	quantum	mechanics	to	stem	in	part	from	the	fact	that	it	was	developed	without	a	
primitive	ontology,	either	because	of	the	conviction	that	a	realist	understanding	of	the	theory	is	
impossible,	or	because	of	the	conviction	that	it	describes	the	wave	function,	which	because	of	
its	high-dimensional	nature	is	ill-suited	to	play	the	role	of	primitive	ontology.	Hence	Allori	
(2013,	69–70)	concludes	that	we	should	supply	quantum	mechanics	with	a	primitive	ontology	
after	the	fact—and	in	the	case	of	the	GRW	theory,	that	means	either	flashes	or	a	mass	density	
distribution.	
	 I	do	not	dispute	the	need	for	a	theory	to	“close	the	circle”,	and	if	primitive	ontology	is	
ontology	such	that	the	circle	can	be	closed,	I	do	not	dispute	the	need	for	that	either.	But	I	have	
some	qualms	about	the	particular	proposals	on	offer.		My	initial	worry	is	methodological:	How	
do	you	find	out	what	the	primitive	ontology	of	a	theory	is?	Allori	(2013,	63)	is	surely	right	that	
the	primitive	ontology	of	a	theory	can’t	simply	be	read	off	its	mathematical	formulation.	Since	
the	dynamical	law	of	quantum	mechanics	governs	the	evolution	of	the	wave	function	over	
time,	much	as	Newton’s	laws	govern	particle	positions,	one	might	think	that	the	ontology	of	
quantum	mechanics	directly	corresponds	to	the	wave	function—that	quantum	mechanics	is	
about	a	wave-like	entity	inhabiting	a	high-dimensional	configuration	space.	Allori	points	out	
that	this	is	not	how	we	identify	primitive	ontology.	In	the	case	of	Newtonian	mechanics,	an	
ontology	of	point	masses	is	presupposed	as	the	starting	point	for	physical	theory	construction,	
not	read	off	the	theory	after	the	fact.	Indeed,	given	that	many	disparate	physical	systems	can	
be	modelled	using	the	same	mathematics,	reading	the	ontology	off	the	mathematics	seems	
doomed	to	failure.	Think	of	the	variety	of	applications	of	the	mathematics	of	the	simple	
harmonic	oscillator!	
	 So	if	we	can’t	read	the	ontology	off	the	theory,	how	should	we	proceed?	Allori	(2013,	
69)	suggests	that	primitive	ontologies	are	“proposals”	about	how	to	understand	quantum	
mechanics.	That	is,	we	use	our	ingenuity	to	come	up	with	an	ontology	that	quantum	mechanics	
could	be	about.	This	seems	very	much	in	the	spirit	of	Ghirardi’s	proposal	of	a	mass	density	
ontology,	and	perhaps	also	in	the	spirit	of	Bell’s	proposal	of	a	flash	ontology—although	note	
Bell’s	(1987,	45)	insistence	that	the	flashes	are	“part	of	the	wavefunction,	not	something	else”.	
The	basic	idea	is	that	the	primitive	ontology	of	quantum	mechanics	is	a	separate	hypothesis,	a	
hypothesis	that	is	supported	to	the	extent	that	it	can	explain	the	properties	of	macroscopic	
objects,	including	measuring	devices	and	human	brains.	
	 Certainly	one	can	postulate	a	primitive	ontology	for	quantum	mechanics.	But	I	see	
danger	in	this	approach.	The	most	obvious	danger	is	underdetermination:	there	are	too	many	
competing	proposals,	and	no	way	to	decide	between	them.	In	addition	to	a	mass	density	
ontology	and	a	flash	ontology,	one	might	propose	that	the	quantum	state	describes	properties	
of	spacetime	regions	(Wallace	and	Timpson	2010),	or	a	collective	property	of	a	set	of	particles	
(Monton	2013).	There	are	doubtless	many	other	possibilities.	How	can	we	determine	which	is	
correct?	Since	each	ontology	is	constructed	to	be	fully	consistent	with	the	predictions	of	
quantum	mechanics,	there	is	no	possibility	of	an	empirical	answer.	Perhaps	extra-empirical	
virtues	like	explanatory	power	can	come	to	the	rescue	here,	but	the	historical	track-record	of	
this	approach	is	debatable.	
	 Furthermore,	the	explanatory	power	of	the	mass	density	and	flash	ontologies	can	be	
called	into	question.	Consider,	for	example,	a	solid	object	whose	quantum	wave	function	is	well	
localized	in	a	particular	region	of	configuration	space,	with	“tails”	extending	elsewhere.	The	
corresponding	mass	density	distribution	is	large	in	the	relevant	region	of	3-space,	and	small	
elsewhere.	Now	consider	a	second	object	passing	through	the	region	where	the	mass	density	of	
the	first	is	small.	How	should	we	expect	it	to	behave?	The	mass	density	picture	suggests	that	
the	second	object	moves	through	a	“sea”	of	rarefied	matter,	resulting	in	a	small	but	constant	
force.	But	spontaneous	collapse	quantum	mechanics	tells	us	that	there	is	no	such	force;	
instead,	the	small	“tails”	on	the	wave	function	tell	us	the	probability	of	a	collapse	in	which	the	
first	object	moves	discontinuously,	say	into	the	path	of	the	second	object.	Rather	than	a	small	
constant	force,	there	is	zero	force,	with	a	small	probability	of	a	large	force.	
	 The	problem,	then,	is	that	the	mass	density	ontology	suggests	a	continuous	effect	where	
the	reality	is	discontinuous.	The	flash	ontology	suffers	from	the	opposite	problem:	it	suggests	
discontinuity	even	in	continuous	cases.	Consider,	for	example,	a	small	object	consisting	of	
around	1019	particles.	If	each	particle	suffers	a	GRW	collapse	every	1016	seconds,	there	is	a	flash	
along	the	trajectory	of	the	object	roughly	once	every	millisecond.	Between	these	times,	there	is	
no	ontology	corresponding	to	the	object	whatsoever.	Nevertheless,	despite	the	discontinuity	of	
the	primitive	ontology,	the	gravitational	and	electromagnetic	forces	exerted	by	the	object	on	
surrounding	objects	will	be	continuous	in	time.	
	 One	might	object	to	both	these	examples	that	they	ignore	the	full	explanatory	
apparatus	of	quantum	mechanics:	quantum	mechanics	can	explain	both	the	discontinuous	
behavior	in	the	first	case	and	the	continuous	behavior	in	the	second.	That	is	correct,	but	the	
point	is	that	the	explanation	in	each	case	is	given	by	the	wave	function	and	the	Born	rule,	not	
the	primitive	ontology.	The	wave	function	may	be	explanatorily	suspect	because	it	inhabits	a	
high-dimensional	space	(Allori	2013,	59),	but	if	the	idea	is	that	the	primitive	ontology	can	
“provide	an	explanatory	scheme	derived	along	the	lines	of	the	classical	one”	(Allori	2013,	70),	
neither	the	mass	density	ontology	nor	the	flash	ontology	clearly	meets	the	classical	explanatory	
standard.	
	
5.	Wave	function	as	structure	
I	have	argued	that	simply	positing	a	primitive	ontology	for	quantum	mechanics	is	a	risky	
business,	both	because	of	the	potential	of	radical	ontological	underdetermination,	and	because	
the	proposed	ontologies	may	fail	to	do	the	requisite	explanatory	work.	How	should	we	identify	
the	appropriate	primitive	ontology,	then?	Allori	(2013,	63)	suggests	a	historical	approach:	
The	mathematical	formalism	of	a	theory	has	a	history	that	constrains	the	interpretation	
of	its	formalism:	the	theory	started	with	a	metaphysical	position	and	its	appropriate	
mathematical	representation,	and	it	continued	with	the	implementation	of	the	suitable	
mathematical	apparatus	necessary	to	determine	how	the	primitive	ontology	evolves.	
So,	for	example,	Newton	begins	with	an	ontological	posit—that	there	are	massive	objects	
moving	in	a	three-dimensional	space—and	then	constructs	the	relevant	mathematical	tools	to	
represent	the	ontology	and	its	temporal	evolution.	Rather	than	trying	to	divine	the	appropriate	
ontology	by	gazing	at	the	mathematics	of	the	final	theory,	we	should	look	to	the	interpretation	
intended	by	the	developers	of	that	theory.	
	 Unfortunately,	though,	as	Allori	(2013,	67)	is	keenly	aware,	the	development	of	
quantum	mechanics	doesn’t	seem	to	fit	this	model.	Although	Schrödinger	began	with	a	
particular	interpretation	of	the	wave	function	in	mind—a	three-dimensional	field—he	
abandoned	this	interpretation	when	he	realized	that	the	wave	function	for	multi-particle	
systems	is	defined	on	configuration	space,	not	3-space.	With	the	blessing	of	Bohr	and	
Heisenberg,	quantum	mechanics	forged	ahead	without	any	conception	of	the	ontology	
described	by	the	mathematics.	
	 Does	this	mean	that	we	are	forced	to	posit	a	primitive	ontology	for	quantum	mechanics	
after	the	fact,	to	remedy	the	oversight	of	its	developers?	Perhaps	not:	I	think	we	can	make	
some	progress	by	considering	other	historical	precedents.	While	quantum	mechanics	may	be	
unique	in	being	a	theory	developed	in	the	absence	of	a	primitive	ontology,	there	are	a	number	
of	historical	examples	of	theories	developed	on	the	basis	of	a	mistaken	primitive	ontology.	
Consider,	for	example,	Fresnel’s	wave	theory	of	light.	Fresnel	begins	with	an	ontological	posit—
an	all-pervasive	elastic	solid—and	constructs	a	mathematical	theory	of	transverse	waves	in	this	
medium.	We	think	Fresnel’s	mathematical	theory	was	essentially	correct,	even	though	we	now	
think	there	is	no	such	elastic	solid.	
	 What	should	we	make	of	cases	like	this?	Worrall	(1989)	takes	them	as	evidence	for	
structural	realism:	scientific	theories	tell	us	about	the	structure	of	the	world,	but	not	in	general	
about	what	instantiates	that	structure.	This	view	has	a	good	deal	of	plausibility.	What	do	we	
know	about	the	ontological	nature	of	mass	or	charge	or	spin,	over	and	above	the	mathematical	
structures	of	the	physical	theories	containing	those	terms?	“Nothing”	seems	like	an	appropriate	
answer.	
	 Suppose,	then,	that	we	take	a	structural	approach	to	the	wave	function.	What	would	
that	mean?	It	would	mean	endorsing	the	claim	that	the	wave	function	correctly	describes	the	
structure	of	physical	systems	in	certain	contexts,	but	without	endorsing	any	particular	account	
of	the	kind	of	thing	that	instantiates	this	structure.	This	is	not	the	same	as	wave	function	
realism—the	position	that	the	wave	function	describes	a	fundamental	entity	in	a	high-
dimensional	space.	Rather,	the	wave	function	describes	the	structure	instantiated	by	whatever	
fundamental	entities	there	may	be	in	ordinary	three-dimensional	space:	particles,	fields,	
flashes,	mass	density,	or	something	else	entirely.	A	structure	is	not	in	itself	an	object,	but	rather	
a	way	that	objects	relate	to	each	other.	
	 Of	course,	“structure”	is	a	rather	vague	term,	and	it	is	reasonable	to	ask	for	more	details	
about	the	sense	of	the	term	“structure”	as	it	is	used	here.	I	wish	I	had	more	to	say,	but	for	now	I	
only	have	a	negative	characterization	to	give.	One	kind	of	structure	the	world	exhibits	is	
nomological	structure:	events	exhibit	regularities,	and	those	regularities	are	(or	are	produced	
by)	laws.		Dürr,	Goldstein	and	Zanghi	(1992)	suggest	that	wave	function	structure	is	nomological	
structure.	But	the	main	motivation	for	taking	wave	function	structure	as	nomological	is	that	
there	is	a	sense	in	which	it	can	be	taken	to	govern	the	dynamical	evolution	of	the	primitive	
ontology.	The	wave	function	fixes	the	motion	of	the	particles	in	Bohm’s	theory,	the	evolution	of	
the	mass	density	distribution	in	mass-density	GRW,	and	the	probability	distribution	of	flashes	in	
flashy	GRW.	If	one	withholds	from	endorsing	any	particular	primitive	ontology,	then	there	is	no	
particular	reason	to	think	that	the	relationship	between	the	wave	function	and	the	ontology	is	
best	characterized	as	nomological.	
	 Furthermore,	even	if	we	endorse	one	of	the	existing	proposals	concerning	primitive	
ontology,	there	are	well-known	reasons	to	resist	thinking	of	the	wave	function	as	nomological:	
the	form	of	the	wave	function	depends	on	the	nature	of	the	system	under	consideration,	and	it	
changes	over	time	(Brown	and	Wallace	2005,	533).	We	don’t	usually	conceive	of	laws	this	way.	
Of	course,	we	can	always	extend	our	conception	of	law	to	include	contingent,	time-evolving	
laws	(Callender	2015,	3157),	but	such	a	move	threatens	to	elide	an	important	distinction.	
Suppose	we	apply	quantum	mechanics	to	the	motion	of	a	set	of	charged	particles.	These	
particles	exert	forces	on	each	other	according	to	an	inverse	square	law,	and	this	law	is	reflected	
in	the	Hamiltonian	term	appearing	in	the	Schrödinger	equation.	The	inverse	square	law	is	
neither	contingent	nor	time-evolving.	One	could	always	propose	that	there	are	two	basic	kinds	
of	law,	but	it	does	less	damage	to	standard	physical	thought	to	conceive	of	the	wave	function	
as	a	summary	of	the	relations	between	the	three-dimensional	entities	involved	(whatever	they	
may	be),	rather	than	a	law	governing	those	entities.	
	
6.	Closing	the	circle—and	opening	another	
My	proposal,	then,	is	that	we	should	think	of	the	wave	function	as	a	structure,	but	withhold	
commitment	to	any	particular	account	of	the	ontology	that	instantiates	this	structure.	And	my	
claim	is	that	this	is	enough	to	close	the	circle,	at	least	for	a	spontaneous	collapse	theory.	To	
appreciate	what	it	takes	to	close	the	circle,	consider	again	the	case	of	Fresnel’s	wave	theory	of	
light.	Poisson	famously	derived	from	this	theory	the	existence	of	a	bright	spot	in	the	center	of	a	
circular	shadow.	Mathematically	speaking,	what	he	actually	derived	was	a	region	of	high-
amplitude	wave	structure	surrounded	by	a	region	of	low-amplitude	wave	structure.	This	was	
enough	to	underwrite	the	existence	of	the	bright	spot,	even	without	any	hypothesis	concerning	
the	nature	of	the	ontology	that	instantiates	the	wave	structure.	That	is,	Fresnel’s	wave	theory	
closes	the	circle:	it	enables	us	to	locate	observable	experimental	outcomes	within	the	
framework	of	the	theory.	
	 We	can	do	the	same	with	a	spontaneous	collapse	theory.	Consider	a	measurement	of	
the	spin	of	a	spin-1/2	particle	in	which	it	is	deflected	by	a	magnetic	field	and	then	to	one	of	a	
pair	of	suitably-positioned	detectors,	each	of	which	responds	to	detection	by	raising	a	flag.	If	
the	particle	is	initially	in	a	symmetric	superposition	of	spins	along	the	measurement	direction,	
then	the	wave	function	of	the	particle	plus	detection	apparatus	evolves	to	a	symmetric	
superposition	in	configuration	space,	but	one	term	in	this	superposition	is	rapidly	made	many	
orders	of	magnitude	larger	than	the	other	by	the	spontaneous	collapse	mechanism.	That	is,	the	
vast	majority	of	the	wave	function	amplitude	at	the	end	of	the	measurement	is	concentrated	
around	a	particular	small	region	of	configuration	space.	Even	in	the	absence	of	a	preferred	
account	of	the	underlying	ontology,	we	know	how	to	interpret	this	structure:	it	is	the	structure	
of	things	in	three-space,	whatever	their	underlying	ontology	may	turn	out	to	be.	Ordinary	
objects	like	flags	are	made	out	of	this	three-dimensional	ontology.	That	is,	the	high-amplitude	
region	of	configuration	space	tells	us	the	locations	of	the	two	flags	in	three-space:	it	is	either	a	
structure	in	which	the	“up”	flag	is	raised	or	a	structure	in	which	the	“down”	flag	is	raised.	
	 Hence	there	is	no	need	to	endorse	any	particular	account	of	primitive	ontology	so	that	a	
spontaneous	collapse	theory	can	close	the	circle.	For	macroscopic	systems,	spontaneous	
collapse	picks	out	a	particular	small	region	of	configuration	space,	and	that	region	specifies	the	
locations	of	ordinary	objects	in	3-space.	Thus	we	can	find	the	unique	observed	outcome	of	a	
measurement	within	the	theory.	More	directly,	since	neuroscience	suggests	that	our	
experience	supervenes	on	the	electrochemical	configuration	of	our	brains,	the	specification	of	a	
small	region	of	configuration	space	also	specifies	human	experiences.	
	 Can	we	remain	agnostic	about	primitive	ontology	then?	I	am	not	sure.	I	suspect	that	
spontaneous	collapse	theories	do	face	an	explanatory	problem,	but	that	it	concerns	the	micro-
world	rather	than	human	experience.	We	have	no	serious	difficulty	locating	measurement	
results	and	our	experience	of	them	within	the	structural	framework	of	spontaneous	collapse	
theories.	The	things	that	are	more	difficult	to	locate	are	the	explanatory	entities	of	classical	
physics—particles	and	fields.	As	Healey	(2015)	has	forcefully	argued,	quantum	explanation	is	
parasitic	on	classical	concepts.	We	measure	the	spin	of	a	spin-1/2	particle	by	passing	it	through	
a	magnetic	field.	The	Hamiltonian	term	in	the	Schrödinger	equation	contains	a	term	
corresponding	to	the	interaction	of	this	point-particle	with	the	field.	But	how	do	we	find	these	
particles	and	fields	in	the	wave	function	structure?	
	 One	might	think	that	it	is	here	that	the	proposals	for	primitive	ontology	might	do	some	
work.	The	flash	ontology,	though,	is	clearly	of	no	use:	microscopic	systems	produce	no	flashes	
over	reasonable	time-scales,	and	hence	correspond	to	no	ontology	whatsoever	according	to	the	
flash	proposal.	The	mass	density	ontology	is	more	promising,	the	obvious	approach	being	to	
treat	a	particle	as	a	localized	region	of	high	mass	density.	Ghirardi	cautions	against	such	an	
interpretation,	though.	Essentially,	the	problem	is	the	microscopic	analog	of	the	explanatory	
worry	for	the	mass	density	ontology	explained	in	section	4.	When	the	mass	density	for	a	
particle	is	spread	out	over	a	large	region,	a	second	particle	passing	through	the	region	won’t	
experience	a	continuous,	small	force,	as	the	spread-out	mass	density	would	lead	you	to	expect,	
but	rather	zero	force,	with	a	small	probability	of	a	large	force	(“collision”).	Hence	Ghirardi,	
Grassi	and	Benatti	(1995,	18)	construct	a	criterion	for	deciding	when	the	mass	density	
distribution	is	“objective”,	one	that	typically	applies	to	macroscopic	objects	but	not	to	single	
particles.	
	 One	could	reject	this	latter	move,	and	hold	that	microscopic	systems	have	an	associated	
mass	density	that	is	just	as	objective	as	that	of	macroscopic	systems	(Monton	2004).	On	this	
account,	a	single	“particle”	is	really	a	localized	region	of	high	mass	density,	albeit	one	that	can	
split	in	two	or	spread	out.	One	might	quite	reasonably	think	that	this	is	just	how	quantum	
“particles”	behave:	sometimes	they	spread	out,	and	act	more	like	waves.	Concerning	Ghirardi’s	
worry	about	the	behavior	of	regions	of	low	mass	density,	Monton	responds	that	the	anomalous	
behavior	is	explained	by	the	wave	function	alone,	not	the	mass	density.	Monton	is	happy	to	
concede	that	“mass	density	is	epiphenomenal”	(2004,	419).	But	while	this	may	be	acceptable	
for	Monton’s	purposes,	clearly	mass	density	is	not	functioning	as	primitive	ontology	here.	
	 So	neither	the	mass	density	ontology	nor	the	flash	ontology	adequately	explains	the	role	
of	particles	in	quantum	mechanics.	One	possible	move	at	this	point	would	be	to	insist	that	the	
primitive	ontology	is	just	particles	in	three-dimensional	space.	The	primitive	ontology	approach	
is	flexible:	in	addition	to	the	obvious	particle-based	quantum	theory	(Bohm’s	theory),	versions	
of	the	GRW	theory	can	be	constructed	that	have	a	primitive	ontology	of	particles	(Allori	et	al.	
2014;	Allori	2019).	The	challenges	facing	this	approach	are	well	known—most	notably	that	it	is	
hard	to	square	the	law	governing	the	evolution	of	the	particles	with	relativity.	But	this	looks	to	
me	like	the	direction	to	take.	That	is,	I	submit	that	the	real	ontological	puzzle	of	the	quantum	
world	doesn’t	concern	human	experience,	but	rather	concerns	how	our	physical	theories—
quantum,	relativistic,	and	classical—hang	together.	
	
7.	Conclusion	
Ghirardi’s	physical	and	philosophical	insight	ran	deep.	He	realized	the	need	for	an	account	of	
the	quantum	world	in	which	it	is	possible	to	locate	our	experience	of	measurement	outcomes,	
and	unlike	von	Neumann,	he	succeeded	at	producing	one.	In	fact,	matters	are	simpler	than	he	
realized:	there	is	no	need	for	a	mass	density	distribution,	or	any	other	particular	account	of	
primitive	ontology,	in	order	to	close	the	circle,	since	the	wave	function,	understood	as	a	
structure	of	three-dimensional	things,	can	do	the	job	by	itself.	
	 However,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	there	is	no	further	work	to	be	done.	Quantum	
mechanics	does	not	only	have	to	be	hospitable	to	human	experience;	it	also	needs	to	be	
hospitable	to	classical	explanation,	since	quantum	explanation	is	parasitic	on	classical.	
Ghirardi’s	mass	density	ontology	is	of	little	help	here.	Unless,	with	Healey	(2015,	11),	we	give	up	
thinking	of	quantum	mechanics	as	descriptive	at	all,	we	need	to	look	elsewhere	for	an	
understanding	of	the	ontology	of	the	quantum	world.	
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